Pablo Picasso. The Lovers. 1923.
Oil on canvas. The National
Gallery of Art, Washington, DC, USA
(larger image)

Roughly, this means that chemistry is based on physics, biology is based on chemistry, psychology and sociology are based on biology. The first two of these reductions are commonly accepted but the last step is controversial and therefore the frontier of reductionism: evolutionary psychology[4] and sociobiology versus those who claim that such special sciences are inherently irreducible. Reductionists believe that the behavioral sciences should become a "genuine" scientific discipline by being based exclusively on genetic biology.

In the painting (right) by the Spanish artist Pablo Picasso (1881-1973), titled "The Lovers," painted in 1923, we see that the two figures are rendered realistically and that they have the appearance of being a loving couple. But, the hands and the faces have been innately simplified and are presented as simple lines rather than circumspectly imitated models.

We still read them as hands and faces, but they have been simplified from the natural forms. This simplification of the image allows Picasso freedom with line and paint, rather than to be entirely involved in painting reality.

Richard Dawkins,
The Selfish Gene
Book Cover

In his book The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins introduced the term "hierarchic reductionism". This means that reductionism can only work when it is used one level at a time. For example: when you throw Stephen Jay Gould out of a window, his fall can be explained by classical mechanics. But you should not try to understand his work from such elementary principles.

In his letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor 14:1), Paul the apostle urges them (and us) to desire spirutual "gift(s)" rather than desiring a spirutual "gift."

St Paul Healing the Cripple at Lystra. Artist: Karel Dujardin. Date: 1663. Medium: Oil on canvas, 179 x 139 cm. Location: Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam
(larger image)

Now at Lystra there was a man sitting who could not use his feet. He was crippled from birth and had never walked. –Acts 14:8

• Luke 11:13
  If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will the heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask him!"
• 1 Corinthians 12:1
  [ Spiritual Gifts ] Now concerning spiritual gifts, brothers, I do not want you to be uninformed.
• 1 Corinthians 12:4
  Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit;
• 1 Corinthians 12:9
  to another faith by the same Spirit, to another gifts of healing by the one Spirit,
• 1 Corinthians 14:1
  [ Prophecy and Tongues ] Pursue love, and earnestly desire the spiritual gifts, especially that you may
• Hebrews 2:4
  while God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his will.

There are several generally accepted types or forms of reduction in both science and philosophy:

• Ontological reductionism is the idea that everything that exists is made from a small number of basic substances that behave in regular ways.
• Methodological reductionism is the idea that explanations of things, such as scientific explanations, ought to be continually reduced to the very simplest entities possible (but no simpler). Occam‘s Razor forms the basis of this type of reductionism.
• Theoretical reductionism is the idea that older theories or explanations are not generally replaced outright by new ones, but that new theories are refinements or reductions of the old theory into more efficacious forms with greater detail and explanatory power. The older theories are supposedly absorbed into the newer ones and they can be deductively derived from the latter. Scientific reductionism has been used to describe all of the above ideas as they relate to science, but is most often used to describe the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to scientific explanations.
• Scientific reductionism has been used to describe all of the above ideas as they relate to science, but is most often used to describe the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to scientific explanations.
• Linguistic reductionism is the idea that everything can be described in a language with a limited number of core concepts, and combinations of those concepts.
• The term "greedy reductionism" was coined by Professor of Philosophy Daniel Dennett[3] to condemn those forms of reductionism that try to explain too much with too little.
• Eliminativism is sometimes regarded as a form of reductionism. Eliminativism is the idea that some objects referred to in a given theory do not exist. Accordingly, the terms of that theory are abandoned or eliminated. Eliminativism is often regarded as a form of reductionism, since the eliminated theory is at some point replaced by a theory referring to the objects that were not eliminated. For example, the theory that some diseases are caused by occupation by a demon has been eliminated. Accordingly it has been reduced by elimination to other theories about the causes of diseases.

In J. R. Lucas's view, "..whether or not the physical world exists, time exists if a personal God alone exists. Now Lucas is clearly correct, I think, in maintaining that a succession of contents of consciousness in God's mind would itself be sufficient to generate a temporal series, and his insistence on this score is a healthy antidote for the physical reductionism that too often poisons the contemporary philosophy of space and time. But what if God's mental life in the absence of any created world is not discursive, but changeless? Why could the contents of God's consciousness not be comprised of tenselessly true beliefs such as 'No humans exist,' '7+5=12,' 'In W* Socrates drinks hemlock,' 'Anything that has a shape has a size,' 'If Jones were in C, he would write to his wife,' 'The atomic number of gold is 78,' 'God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect,' and so on, and be such that He never acquires and never loses any of His beliefs? Would not such a changeless consciousness of truth be plausibly regarded as timeless?

"Short of a proof of the incoherence of all relational theories of time, we must grant that time would not be a concomitant of such a consciousness. What reason is there, then, to regard such a consciousness as impossible? Here Lucas has nothing to say; he confesses, 'My claim . . . that time is a concomitant of consciousness, is of course only a claim, and I have been unable to argue for it, except by citing poetry . . . . arguments would be better.'
-J. R. Lucas, The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 175)

History

Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automata — De homines 1662.
(larger image)

Types of reductionism

Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities. Methodological reductionism would thus hold that the atomic explanation of a substance’s boiling point is preferable to the chemical explanation, and that an explanation based on even smaller particles (quarks, perhaps) would be even better.

Methodological reductionism, therefore, is the position that all scientific theories either can or should be reduced to a single super-theory through the process of theoretical reduction.

Finally, ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances. This claim is usually metaphysical, and is most commonly a form of monism, in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance. (A dualist who is an ontological reductionist would presumably believe that everything is reducible to one of two substances.)

Reductionism and science

In science, reductionism can be understood to imply that certain fields of study are based on areas that study smaller spatial scales or organizational units. While it is commonly accepted that the foundations of chemistry are based in physics, and microbiology is rooted in chemistry, similar statements become controversial when one considers larger-scale fields. For example, claims that sociology is based on psychology, or that economics is based on sociology and psychology would be met with reservations. These claims are difficult to substantiate even though there are clear connections between these fields (for instance, most would agree that psychology can impact and inform economics.) The limit of reductionism's usefulness stems from emergent properties of complex systems which are more common at certain levels of organization. For example, certain aspects of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology are rejected by some who claim that complex systems are inherently irreducible and that a holistic approach is needed to understand them.

Daniel Clement Dennett[3] defends scientific reductionism, which he says is really little more than materialism, by making a distinction between this and what he calls "Greedy reductionism": the idea that every explanation in every field of science should be reduced all the way down to particle physics or string theory. Greedy reductionism, he says, deserves some of the criticism that has been heaped on reductionism in general because the lowest-level explanation of a phenomenon, even if it exists, is not always the best way to understand or explain it.

Some strong reductionists believe that the behavioral sciences should become "genuine" scientific disciplines by being based on genetic biology, and on the systematic study of culture (cf. Dawkins's concept of memes). In his book The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins introduced the term "hierarchical reductionism" to describe the view that complex systems can be described with a hierarchy of organizations, each of which can only be described in terms of objects one level down in the hierarchy. He provides the example of a computer, which under hierarchical reductionism can be explained well in terms of the operation of hard drives, processors, and memory, but not on the level of AND or NOR gates, or on the even lower level of electrons in a semiconductor medium.

Both Dennett and Steven Pinker argue that too many people who are opposed to science use the words "reductionism" and "reductionist" less to make coherent claims about science than to convey a general distaste for the endeavor, saying the opponents often use the words in a rather slippery way, to refer to whatever they dislike most about science. Dennett suggests that critics of reductionism may be searching for a way of salvaging some sense of a higher purpose to life, in the form of some kind of non-material / supernatural intervention. Dennett terms such aspirations "skyhooks," in contrast to the "cranes" that reductionism uses to build its understanding of the universe from solid ground.

Others argue that inappropriate use of reductionism limits our understanding of complex systems. In particular, ecologist Robert Ulanowicz says that science must develop techniques to study ways in which larger scales of organization influence smaller ones, and also ways in which feedback loops create structure at a given level, independently of details at a lower level of organization. He advocates (and uses) information theory as a framework to study propensities in natural systems. Ulanowicz attributes these criticisms of reductionism to the philosopher Karl Popper and biologist Robert Rosen.

Reductionism in mathematics

As an alternative to set theory, others have argued for category theory as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.

Ontological reductionism

Ontological reductionism takes two different forms: Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it says that every perceivable item is a sum of items at a smaller level of complexity. Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum (of typically less complex) type(s) of item(s). For perceivable types of item, it says that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items at a lower level of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.

Michael Ruse has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against vitalism.

Reductionism in linguistics

Limits of reductionism

The term Greedy reductionism, coined by Daniel Clement Dennett, is used to criticize inappropriate use of reductionism. Other authors use different language when describing the same thing.

In philosophy

In science

'More is different' to expose some of the limitations of reductionism. The limitation of reductionism was explained as follows. The sciences can be arranged roughly linearly in a hierarchy as particle physics, many body physics, chemistry, molecular biology, cellular biology, .., physiology, psychology and social sciences. The elementary entities of one science obeys the laws of the science that precedes it in the above hierarchy. But, this does not imply that one science is just an applied version of the science that precedes it. Quoting from the article, "At each stage, entirely new laws, concepts and generalizations are necessary, requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the previous one. Psychology is not applied biology nor is biology applied chemistry."

Sven Erik Jorgensen, an ecologist, lays out both theoretical and practical arguments for a holistic approach in certain areas of science, especially ecology. He argues that many systems are so complex that it will not ever be possible to describe all their details. Drawing an analogy to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics, he argues that many interesting and relevant ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and thus cannot be measured or observed without influencing and changing the system in some way. He also points to the importance of interconnectedness in biological systems. His viewpoint is that science can only progress by outlining what questions are unanswerable and by using models that do not attempt to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels both higher and lower in the hierarchy.

Disciplines such as cybernetics and systems theory strongly embrace a non-reductionist view of science, sometimes going as far as explaining phenomena at a given level of hierarchy in terms of phenomena at a higher level, in a sense, the opposite of a reductionist approach.

In decision theory

In religion

Benefits of reduction

At the same time, the requirements for satisfactorily showing that one thing is reducible to another are extremely steep. First and foremost, all features of the original property or object must be accounted for. For example, lightning would not be reducible to the electrical activity of air molecules if the reduction explained why lightning is deadly, but not why it always seeks the highest point to strike. Our preference for simple and unified explanations is a strong force for reductionism, but our demand that all relevant phenomena be accounted for is at least as strong a force against it.

Alternatives to reductionism

In many cases (such as the kinetic theory of gases), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other cases, trying to do this leads to a fallacy of composition. In those systems, emergent properties of the system are almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. Complexity theory studies such systems.

See also

• Eliminativism
• Theology
• Aristotle
• Holism
• Emergentism

  Some philosophers hold that emergent properties causally interact with more fundamental levels, while others maintain that higher-order properties simply supervene over lower levels without direct causal interaction. The latter group therefore holds a definition of emergentism which can be stated as follows

  a property P of composite object O is emergent if it is metaphysically possible for another object to lack property P even if that object is composed of parts with intrinsic properties identical to those in O and has those parts in an identical configuration.

Notes

1. « The Brights Net Retrieved 6/22/2010
2. « Richard Dawkins

   "He is an internationally known evolutionary biologist and the recently retired Charles Simonyi Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University. Dr. Dawkins has written several books, among them The Selfish Gene, Climbing Mount Improbable, Unweaving the Rainbow, The Ancestor's Tale, and, most widely sold internationally, The God Delusion."

   The Brights Net Enthusiastic Brights Retrieved 6/22/2010
3. « Daniel Dennett

   Daniel C. Dennett is the author of Freedom Evolves, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, and Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon. He is University Professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, and Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. As a philosopher, he is primarily concerned with providing a philosophy of mind which is grounded in and fruitful to empirical research. He is an avid sailor. Read his New York Times article "The Bright Stuff", visit his home page, and/or see his video ("The Appeal of the Brights Movement") now. The Brights Net Enthusiastic Brights

4. « Daniel C. Dennett, Co-Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, University Professor, Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University
   • "Preachers who are not Believers," Evolutionary Psychology, Vol. 8, Issue I, March, 2010, pp. 121-50. Retrived 6/22/2010.
   • Dennett and LaScola's report on preachers who are no longer believers is also posted here, at the Washington Post Retrived 6/22/2010
   • Karl Giberson, Ph.D: The Temptation of Faith Fibbing for Jesus

     Dennett and LaScola are planning a follow-up study, and clergy interested in participating, in strict confidence, should contact Linda LaScola at:
     LindaLaScola@gmail.com"
     or by calling: 202-363-9367
     or writing:
     LaScola Qualitative Research
     3900 Connecticut Avenue, NW 101F
     Washington, DC 20008

5. Steven Pinker

   After teaching at MIT for two decades, he became the Johnstone Professor of Psychology at Harvard. Pinker's experimental research on cognition and language won the Troland Award from the National Academy of Sciences and two prizes from the American Psychological Association. He has also received several honorary doctorates and numerous awards for graduate and undergraduate teaching, general achievement, and his critically acclaimed books The Language Instinct, How the Mind Works, and The Blank Slate. Pinker has also appeared in many television documentaries and writes frequently in the popular press, including in the The New York Times, Time, and Slate.

   Books by Pinker

   Enthusiastic Brights Retrieved 6/22/2010

References

• see eg Reductionism in the Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science
• Burns, Tony (2000), "Materialism in Ancient Greek Philosophy and in the Writings of the Young Marx", Historical Materialism 7: 3, doi:10.1163/156920600100414623
• Interview with Third Way magazine in which Richard Dawkins discusses reductionism and religion, February 28, 1995
• R.E. Ulanowicz, Ecology: The Ascendant Perspective, Columbia University Press (1997) (ISBN 0231108281)
• R. Gregory Taylor, "Zermelo, Reductionism, and the Philosophy of Mathematics". Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Fall 1993)
• Michael Silberstein, John McGeever, "The Search for Ontological Emergence", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 195 (April 1999), (ISSN: 0031-8094).
• Michael Ruse, "Do Organisms Exist?", Amer. Zool., 29:1061-1066 (1989)
• P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter, Aarhus University Press (ISBN 8772888148) (2001)
• The Evolution of Complexity - Abstracts. Causality as Constraint - A. Juarrero Retrieved 06/27/2009.
• Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred by Stuart Kauffman
• A. Scott, Reductionism Revisited, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, No. 2, 2004 pp. 51-68 Retrieved 06/27/2009.
• Anderson, P.W. (1972). "More is Different". Science 177 (4047): 393–396. doi:10.1126/science.177.4047.393. PMID 17796623.
• S. E. Jørgensen, Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern, 3rd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, (ISBN 1-4020-0651-9) (2002) Chapters 1 & 2.
• Downward Causation
• J.O. Berger, Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. Springer-Verlag 2nd ed. (1985) ch. 2. (ISBN 3540960988)

Further reading

• Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press; 2nd edition, December 1989 ISBN 0-19-217773-7.
• Descartes (1637) Discourses Part V
• Dupre, J. (1993) The Disorder of Things. Harvard University Press.
• Jones, Richard H. Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality. Bucknell University Press. (For the general reader.)
• Nagel, E. (1961) The Structure of Science. New York.
• Ruse, M. (1988) Philosophy of Biology. Albany, NY.
• Dennett, Daniel. (1995) Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-684-82471-X.
• Fritjof Capra. (1982) The Turning Point.
• Alexander Rosenberg (2006) Darwinian Reductionism or How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology. University of Chicago Press.
• Steven Pinker (2002) The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Viking Penguin.
• Steven Weinberg (2002) describes what he terms the culture war among physicists in his review of A New Kind of Science
• Eric Scerri The reduction of chemistry to physics has become a central aspect of the philosophy of chemistry. See several articles by this author.
• Ingo Brigandt and Alan Love, "Reductionism in Biology", in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University. Retrieved 06/27/2009.
• John Dupré: The Disunity of Science, an interview at the Galilean Library covering criticisms of reductionism. Retrieved 06/27/2009.