 Fresco of a banquet at a tomb in the Catacomb of Saints Marcellinus and Peter, Via Labicana, Rome
(larger image)Agápe (Christian theology) Caritas (agapē, αγαπη) is an unconditional love directed towards one's neighbor which is not dependent on any lovable qualities that the object of love possesses. Agape is the love that brings forth caring regardless of circumstance. Lewis recognizes this as the greatest of loves, and sees it as a specifically Christian virtue. The chapter on the subject focuses on the need of subordinating the natural loves to the love of God, who is full of charitable love. Lewis states that "He is so full, in fact, that it overflows, and He can't help but love us." Lewis metaphorically compares love with a garden, charity with the gardening utensils, the lover as the gardener, and God as the elements of nature. God's love and guidance act on our natural love (that cannot remain what it is by itself) as the sun and rain act on a garden: without either, the object (metaphorically the garden; realistically love itself) would cease to be beautiful or worthy. Lewis warns that those who exhibit charity must constantly check themselves that they do not flaunt—and thereby warp—this love ("But when you give to someone, don't tell your left hand what your right hand is doing."—Matthew 6:3), which is its potential threat.
Thomas Jay Oord has defined agape as, "An intentional response to promote well-being when responding to that which has generated ill-being." In his book, The Pilgrimage, author Paulo Coelho defines it as, "The love that consumes," i.e., the highest and purest form of love, one that surpasses all other types of affection. Greek philosophers at the time of Plato and other ancient authors have used forms of this word to denote love of a spouse or family, or affection for a particular activity, in contrast to philia—an affection that could denote either brotherhood or generally non-sexual affection, and eros, an affection of a sexual nature.
A title of the goddess Isis was agapeh theon, or "beloved/darling of the gods," denoting her role as a fertility/life goddess and her pairing as a partner with the masculine god aspects. While this pairing was often sexual in nature, the term agapeh implied a genuine affection and deep love for the goddess.
Although some sources claim agapeh appears in Homer's The Odyssey twice, the word is in fact not used. Instead, two forms of the word agape may be found: agapêton and agapazomenoi. Agapêton is found in Book 5 of The Odyssey and means "beloved" or "well-loved". Agapazomenoi is found in books 7 and 17 of the Odyssey and means “to treat with affection”. The verb agapao is used extensively in the Septuagint as the translation of the common Hebrew term for love which is used to show affection for husband/wife and children, brotherly love, and God's love for humanity. It is uncertain why agapao was chosen, but similarity of consonant sounds (aḥava) may have played a part. The Greek concept may have originated as a transliteration from some Semitic tongue. This usage provides the context for the choice of this otherwise obscure word, in preference to other more common Greek words, as the most frequently used word for love in Christian writings. The use of the noun agape, in this way, appears to be an innovation of the New Testament writers, but is clearly derived from the use of the verb agapao in the Septuagint.[2]
In ChristianitySee also: 1 Corinthians 13
A journalist of Time Magazine has described John 3:16 as "one of the most famous and well-known Bible verses. It has been called the 'Gospel in a nutshell' because it is considered a summary of the central doctrines of Christianity".[3] The word translated "love" in this verse is agape. 16 "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life. — John 3:16 (English Standard Version) Agape received a broader usage under later Christian writers as the word that specifically denoted "Christian" love or "charity" (1 Corinthians 13:1–8), or even God (1 John 4:8, ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν, "God is Love").
The term agape is rarely used in ancient manuscripts, but was used by the early Christians to refer to the self-sacrificing love of God for humanity, which they were committed to reciprocating and practicing towards God and among one another (also see kenosis). When 1 John 4:8 says "God is love," the Greek New Testament uses the word agape to describe God's love.
Agape has been expounded on by many Christian writers in a specifically Christian context. C. S. Lewis, in his book to which this article refers, The Four Loves, used agape to describe what he believed was the highest level of love known to humanity—a selfless love, a love that was passionately committed to the well-being of the other.[4]
The Christian usage of the term agape comes almost directly from the Gospel accounts of the teachings of Jesus. When Jesus was asked what was the greatest commandment,
"'37And he said to him, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. 38 This is the great and first commandment. 39 And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. 40 On these two commandments depend all the Law and the Prophets." —Matthew 22:37-40
In the King James Version of the bible, the word agape is translated "charity" which has a contemporary connotation of giving to meet needs of the less fortunate.[4] In Judaism, the first ("...love the LORD your God..." Deut. 6:5) is the Shema, the second ("...love your neighbor..." Lev. 19:18) is the Great Commandment.
In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus said:
You have heard that it was said, 'Love (agape) your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I tell you: Love (agape) your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? —Matthew 5:42-44 Christian writers have generally described agape as a form of love which is both unconditional and voluntary. Tertullian, in his 2nd century defense of Christians, remarks how Christian love attracted pagan notice: "What marks us in the eyes of our enemies is our loving kindness. 'Only look,' they say, 'look how they love one another'" (Apology 39).
In the New Testament the noun agape is often used to describe God's love. However, the verb form agape is at times used in a negative sense, where it retains its more general meaning of "affection" rather than divine love. Such examples include:
- 2 Timothy 4:10—"…for Demas has forsaken me, having loved [agape] this present world…."
- John 12:43—"for they loved [agape] the praise of men more than the praise from God."
- John 3:19—"but men loved [agape] darkness instead of light because their deeds were evil."
As a mealMain article: Agape feastThe word agape in its plural form is used in the New Testament to describe a meal or feast eaten by early Christians, as in Jude 1:12, and 2 Peter 2:13. It is sometimes believed to be either related to the Eucharist, or another term used for the Eucharist.
Eros
Eros έρως érōs) is passionate love, with sensual desire and longing. Eros is love in the sense of 'being in love'. This is distinct from sexuality, which Lewis calls Venus, although he does spend time discussing sexual activity and its spiritual significance in both a pagan and a Christian sense. He identifies eros as indifferent. This is good because it promotes appreciation of the beloved regardless of any pleasure that can be obtained from them. It can be bad, however, because this blind devotion has been at the root of many of history's most abominable tragedies. In keeping with his warning that "love begins to be a demon the moment [it] begins to be a god", he warns against the danger of elevating eros to the status of a god.
Eros in the Greco-Roman traditionIn the classical world, the phenomenon of love was generally understood as a kind of madness or, as the Greeks put it, theia mania ("madness from the gods").[5] This love passion was described through an elaborate metaphoric and mythological psychological schema involving "love's arrows" or "love darts", the source of which was often given as the mythological Eros or Cupid,[6], sometimes by other mythological deities (such as Rumor[7]). At times, the source of the arrows was said to be the image of the beautiful love object itself. If these arrows were to arrive at the lover's eyes, they would then travel to and 'pierce' or 'wound' his or her heart and overwhelm him/her with desire and longing (love sickness). The image of the "arrow's wound" was sometimes used to create oxymorons and rhetorical antithesis concerning its pleasure and pain.
"Love at first sight" was explained as a sudden and immediate beguiling of the lover through the action of these processes, but was not the only mode of entering into passionate love in classical texts. At times the passion could occur after the initial meeting, as, for example, in Phraedra's letter (IV) to Hippolytus in Ovid's Heroides: "That time I went to Eleusis... it was then most of all (though you had pleased me before) that piercing love lodged in my deepest bones.[8] At times, the passion could precede the first glimpse, as in Paris' letter (XVI) to Helen of Troy in the same work, where Paris says that his love for her came upon him before he had set eyes on her: "...you were my heart's desire before you were known to me. I beheld your features with my soul ere I saw them with my eyes; rumour, that told me of you, was the first to deal my wound."[9] Whether by "first sight" or by other routes, the passionate love concept of the classical authors often had disastrous results. In the event that the loved object was cruel or uninterested, this desire was shown to drive the lover into a state of depression, causing lamentation and illness. Occasionally, the loved objects — because of their sublime beauty — were depicted as unwitting ensnares of lovers (their beauty is a "divine curse" that inspires men to kidnap them or try to rape them).[10] Stories in which unwitting men catch sight of the naked body of Diana the huntress (and sometimes Venus) lead to similar ravages (as in the tale of Actaeon). The classical conception of love's arrows were elaborated upon by the Provençal troubadour poets of southern France in the twelfth century and became part of the European courtly love tradition. In particular, a glimpse of the woman's eyes was said to be the source of the love dart.[11] In some medieval texts, the gaze of a beautiful woman is compared to the sight of a basilisk. These images continued to be circulated and elaborated upon in the Renaissance and Baroque literature[12] and pictorial imagery. Boccaccio for example, in his Il Filostrato mixes the tradition of the eye's darts with the metaphor of Cupid's arrow.[13]: "Nor did he (Troilus) who was so wise shortly before... perceive that Love with his darts dwelt within the rays of those lovely eyes... nor notice the arrow that sped to his heart."[14] The oxymorons and rhetorical antithesis concerning the pleasure and pain from love's dart continued through the 17th century, as, for example, in the classically inspired images of If Love's a Sweet Passion from Henry Purcell's The Fairy Queen (act 3): If Love's a Sweet Passion, why does it torment? If a Bitter, oh tell me whence comes my content? Since I suffer with pleasure, why should I complain, Or grieve at my Fate, when I know 'tis in vain? Yet so pleasing the Pain is, so soft is the Dart,
That at once it both wounds me, and Tickles my Heart. Eros in Plato's philosophyPlato refined his own definition. Although eros is initially felt for a person, with contemplation it becomes an appreciation of the beauty within that person, or even becomes appreciation of beauty itself. Plato does not talk of physical attraction as a necessary part of love, hence the use of the word platonic to mean, "without physical attraction". Plato also said Eros helps the soul remember beauty, and contributes to an understanding of spiritual truth. Lovers and philosophers are all inspired to tell the truth by eros, the god of love. The most famous ancient work on the subject of eros is Plato's Symposium, a dialogue among seven men (including Alcibiades), reclining in a Greek symposium, in which Socrates reveals his knowledge about the nature of eros, inspired by the teaching of Diotima of Mantinea. Eros, in the Socratic logos, can be defined as the longing for wholeness or completeness, a daemon whose aim is to reach wisdom without ever owning her and is used to describe fulfillment between man/woman and man/Gods.
Plato considers eros to be philosophy, the love or desire of wisdom. Wisdom is the greatest of virtues and eros is the desire for the greatest of goods. Eros is therefore the desire for wisdom. Philosophy literally translates to a love of wisdom. It is important to note that Plato does not suggest that love must be for something physically "beautiful". In fact the greatest of goods will be eternal and physical beauty is in no way eternal. Yet, to achieve possession of the beloved's inner beauty and goodness will fulfill their need and emptiness to produce happiness. Happiness is the experience of knowing that your are participating in the good.[15] Thomas Jay Oord defines eros as intentional response to promote overall well-being by enhancing or appreciating what is valuable or good. Eros and Sigmund FreudIn Freudian psychology, eros, also referred to in terms of libido, libidinal energy or love, is the life instinct innate in all humans. It is the desire to create life and favours productivity and construction. Eros battles against the destructive death instinct of Thanatos (death instinct or death drive).German philosopher and sociologist Herbert Marcuse appropriated the concept for his highly influential 1955 work Eros and Civilization. Eros and Carl JungIn Carl Jung's analytical psychology, logos is used for the masculine principle of rationality, in contrast to its female counterpart, eros:Woman’s psychology is founded on the principle of Eros, the great binder and loosener, whereas from ancient times the ruling principle ascribed to man is Logos. The concept of Eros could be expressed in modern terms as psychic relatedness, and that of Logos as objective interest.[16] This points to his theory of the anima/animus syzygy of the male and female psyches. According to Jung, men possess the anima in their unconscious, and this is a caricature of the feminine eros. It is a part of personal individuation for men to confront their anima, by accepting eros (a trait pushed out of phalocratic society). Also intrinsic to this is the ability to see beyond the projected ego and assimilate this into our conscious being. This is eros, as it is the 'desire for wholeness,' which is necessary for us to become in-tune with our selves. By understanding 'passionate love' and the 'desire for wholeness' as 'psychic relatedness,' Jung also demonstrates that the desire for love is a desire for interconnection and interaction with other sentient beings.
FriendshipFriendship (philia, φιλια) also called brotherly love, is one of the four ancient Greek words for love. It is a strong bond existing between people who share a common interest or activity. Lewis explicitly says that his definition of friendship is narrower than mere companionship: friendship in his sense only exists if there is something for the friendship to be "about". He calls Companionship or Clubbableness a matrix for friendship, as friendship can rise in the context of both. Friendship is the least natural of loves, states Lewis; i.e., it is not biologically necessary to progeny like either affection (e.g., rearing a child), eros (e.g., creating a child), or charity (e.g., providing for a child). It has the least association with impulse or emotion. In spite of these characteristics, it was the belief of the ancients, (and Lewis himself), that it was the most admirable of loves because it looked not at the beloved (like eros), but towards that "about"—that thing because of which the relationship was formed. This freed the participants in this friendship from self-consciousness. Because the more they were looking towards something beyond or above themselves, the more those who were looking towards that thing with them were welcomed with the same sincerity, which freed the relationship from jealousy. And although the love may not be biologically necessary, it has, argued Lewis, civilization value. The thing beyond or above themselves may be of monumental importance to society. But without the benefit of friendship to blunt the loneliness of "being the only person who sees this", or the idea that two heads are better than one, many advances in society may never have been embarked upon. The relationship is by its nature selective, and therefore, exclusive. This characteristic is not detrimental per se, but the idea or goal towards which friends strive need not be altruistic. The innocuous ideas may simply be the cause of pseudo-aristocracies that ignore the legitimate cries of those outside their group; the malefic ones may be quite worse.
Philia (Greek: φιλíα) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is usually translated as 'friendship',[17] though in fact his use of the term is much broader. As Gerard Hughes points out, in Books VIII and IX Aristotle gives examples of philia including:
- "young lovers (1156b2),
- lifelong friends (1156b12),
- cities with one another (1157a26),
- political or business contacts (1158a28),
- parents and children (1158b20),
- fellow-voyagers and fellow-soldiers (1159b28),
- members of the same religious society (1160a19),
- or of the same tribe (1161b14),
- a cobbler and the person who buys from him (1163b35)."
[18] All of these different relationships involve getting on well with someone, though Aristotle at times implies that something more like actual liking is required. When he is talking about the character or disposition that falls between obsequiousness or flattery on the one hand and surliness or quarrelsomeness on the other, he says that this state:"has no name, but it would seem to be most like [philia]; for the character of the person in the intermediate state is just what we mean in speaking of a decent friend, except that the friend is also fond of us." (1126b21) This passage indicates also that, though broad, the notion of philia must be mutual, and thus excludes relationships with inanimate objects, though philia with animals, such as pets, is allowed for (see 1155b27–31).
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines the activity involved in philia (τὸ φιλεῖn) as:
"wanting for someone what one thinks good, for his sake and not for one's own, and being inclined, so far as one can, to do such things for him" (1380b36–1381a2) John M. Cooper argues that this indicates:"that the central idea of φιλíα is that of doing well by someone for his own sake, out of concern for him (and not, or not merely, out of concern for oneself). [... Thus] the different forms of φιλíα [as listed above] could be viewed just as different contexts and circumstances in which this kind of mutual well-doing can arise"[19] Aristotle takes philia to be both necessary as a means to happiness ("no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods" [1155a5–6]) and noble or fine (καλόν) in itself.
Types of philiaAristotle divides friendships into three types, based on the motive for forming them: friendships of utility, friendships of pleasure and friendships of the good.
Friendships of utility are relationships formed without regard to the other person at all. Buying merchandise, for example, may require meeting another person but usually needs only a very shallow relationship between the buyer and seller. In modern English, people in such a relationship would not even be called friends, but acquaintances (if they even remembered each other afterwards). The only reason these people are communicating is in order to buy or sell things, which is not a bad thing, but as soon as that motivation is gone, so goes the relationship between the two people unless another motivation is found. Complaints and quarrels generally only arise in this type of friendship. At the next level, friendships of pleasure are based on pure delight in the company of other people. People who drink together or share a hobby may have such friendships. However, these friends may also part--in this case if they no longer enjoy the shared activity, or can no longer participate in it together. Friendships of the good are ones where both friends enjoy each other's characters. As long as both friends keep similar characters, the relationship will endure since the motive behind it is care for the friend. This is the highest level of philia, and in modern English might be called true friendship.
"Now it is possible for bad people as well [as good] to be friends to each other for pleasure or utility, for decent people to be friends to base people, and for someone with neither character to be a friend to someone with any character. Clearly, however, only good people can be friends to each other because of the other person himself; for bad people find no enjoyment in one another if they get no benefit." (1157a18–21) Not all bonds of philia involves reciprocity Aristotle notes. Some examples of these might include love of father to son, elder to younger or ruler to subject. Generally though, the bonds of philia are symmetrical.[20]If philia is a type of love, Thomas Jay Oord has argued that it must be defined so as not to contradict love. Oord defines philia as an intentional response to promote well-being when cooperating with or befriending others. And his philia is not only that meaning. The philia also gives humans authentic friendship.[21]
Self-sufficiency and philiaAristotle recognizes that there is an apparent conflict between what he says about philia and what he says elsewhere (and what is widely held at the time) about the self-sufficient nature of the fulfilled life:
"it is said that the blessedly happy and self-sufficient people have no need of friends. For they already have [all] the goods, and hence, being self-sufficient, need nothing added." (1169b4–6) He offers various answers. The first is based on the inherent goodness of acting for and being concerned for others ("the excellent person labours for his friends and for his native country, and will die for them if he must" [1169a19–20]); thus, being a wholly virtuous and fulfilled person necessarily involves having others for whom one is concerned — without them, one's life is incomplete:
"the solitary person's life is hard, since it is not easy for him to be continuously active all by himself; but in relation to others and in their company it is easier." (1170a6–8) Aristotle's second answer is: "good people's life together allows the cultivation of virtue" (1170a12). Finally, he argues that one's friend is "another oneself", and so the pleasure that the virtuous person gets from his own life is also found in the life of another virtuous person. "Anyone who is to be happy, then, must have excellent friends" (1170b19).
Altruism and egoismFor Aristotle, in order to feel the highest form of philia for another, one must feel it for oneself; the object of philia is, after all, "another oneself". This alone does not commit Aristotle to egoism, of course. Not only is self-love not incompatible with love of others, but Aristotle is careful to distinguish the sort of self-love that is condemned (ascribed to "those who award the biggest share in money, honours,and bodily pleasures to themselves. For these are the goods desired and eagerly pursued by the many on the assumption that they are best" [1168b17–19]) from that which should be admired (ascribed to one who "is always eager above all to perform just or temperate actions or any other actions in accord with the virtues, and in general always gains for himself what is fine [noble, good]" [1168b25–27]). In fact:
"the good person must be a self-lover, since he will both help himself and benefit others by performing fine actions. But the vicious person must not love himself, since he will harm both himself and his neighbours by following his base feelings." (1169a12–15) Aristotle also holds, though, that, as Hughes puts it: "[t]he only ultimately justifiable reason for doing anything is that acting in that way will contribute to a fulfilled life."[22] Thus acts of philia might seem to be essentially egoistic, performed apparently to help others, but in fact intended to increase the agent's happiness. This, however, confuses the nature of the action with its motivation; the good person doesn't perform an action to help a friend because it will give her fulfillment; she performs it in order to help the friend, and in performing it makes both her friend and herself happy. The action is thus good both in itself and for the effect it has on the agent's happiness.[23]
Affection Affection ("storge (στοργή, storgē), is fondness through familiarity, especially between family members or people who have otherwise found themselves together by chance. It is described as the most natural, emotive, and widely diffused of loves: natural in that it is present without coercion; emotive because it is the result of fondness due to familiarity; and most widely diffused because it pays the least attention to those characteristics deemed "valuable" or worthy of love and, as a result, is able to transcend most discriminating factors. Ironically, its strength, however, is what makes it vulnerable. Affection has the appearance of being "built-in" or "ready made", says Lewis, and as a result people come to expect, even to demand, its presence—irrespective of their behavior and its natural consequences.
Storge may be used as a general term to describe the love between exceptional friends, and the desire for them to care compassionately for one another.
Another interpretation is for storge to be used to describe a sexual relationship between two people that gradually grew out of a friendship[24]—storgic lovers sometimes cannot pinpoint the moment that friendship turned to love. Storgic lovers are friends first, and the friendship can endure even beyond the breakup of the sexual relationship.[24] They want their significant others to also be their best friends, and will choose their mates based on homogamy.
Storgic lovers place much importance on commitment, and find that their motivation to avoid committing infidelity is to preserve the trust between the two partners. Children and marriage are seen as legitimate forms of their bond, while sex is of lesser importance than in other love styles.
Advantages of storgic love may be the level of friendship, understanding, and intimacy that the partners share, while disadvantages may include a lack of passion and potential boredom in the relationship.

Notes
- «Cover image for The Four Loves, published by Harvest Books (September 29, 1971). Created by Christie’s Images/CORBIS. The image is being used per fair use.
- «Agape as a term for love or affection is rarely used in ancient manuscripts. According to Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Love definition) the word is believed to have been coined by the Bible authors from the verb agapao
- «John 3:16 in Pop Culture. Time.com
- «Kreeft, Peter. "Love" Accessed: May 22, 2009
- «Tallis, Frank (February 2005). "Crazy for You". The Psychologist 18 (2).
- «See, for example, the Amores and the Heroides of Ovid which frequently refer to the overwhelming passion caused by Cupid's darts.
- «See Ovid's letter from Paris, below.
- «Ovid. Heroides and Amores. Translated by Grant Showerman. Second edition revised by G.P. Goold. Loeb Calssical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, IV, 67-70, p 49. ISBN 0-674-99045-5
- «Ovid. Heroides and Amores. Translated by Grant Showerman. Second edition revised by G.P. Goold. Loeb Calssical Library. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, XVI, 36-38, pp. 199-201. ISBN 0-674-99045-5
- «For more on these tropes in the Ancient Greek novel, see Françoise Létoublon, Les Lieux communs du roman: Stéréotypes grecs d'aventure et d'amour, Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1993. ISBN 90-04-09724-4.
- «See the introduction by Nathaniel Edward Griffin to The Filostrato of Giovanni Boccaccio (New York: Bilbo and Tannen, no date. ISBN 0-8196-0817-X): "This doctrine of the immediate visual perception of one's lady as a prerequisite to the birth of love originated among the beaux esprits de Provence. [...] According to this description, love originates upon the eyes of the lady when encountered by those of her future lover. The love thus generated is conveyed on bright beams of light from her eyes to his, through which it passes to take up its abode in his heart." (p.76, note 2)
- «For a full discussion of the scene of "love at first sight" in fiction, see Jean Rousset, "Leurs yeux se rencontrèrent" : la scène de première vue dans le roman, Paris: José Corti, 1981.
- «Giovanni Boccaccio, The Filostrato (see supra): "In the desription of the enamorment of Troilus is a singular blending of the Provençal conception of the eyes as the birthplace of love with the classical idea of the God of Love with his bows and quiver..." (p.77, note 2)
- «Ibid., canto 1, strophe 29; translation by Nathaniel Edward Griffin and Arthur Beckwith Myrick, p. 147.
- «Plato. Symposium. 199c5-212c
- «Carl Jung, Aspects of the Feminine, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 65, ISBN 0710095228.
- «And also sometimes as "love".
- «Hughes, p.168n.
- «Cooper, p.302
- «Happiness: Personhood, Community, Purpose By Pedro Alexis Tabensky, Published by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2003, ISBN 0754607348, 9780754607342, page 205
- «"Introduction - Perspectives on Love and Agapé: Contemporary Views on Love" by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p.9
- «Hughes, pp 173–174.
- «See Hughes, pp 175–176. For an alternative view, see Kraut, chapter 2.
- «And also sometimes as "love".
- «Hughes, p.168n.
- «Cooper, p.302
- «Happiness: Personhood, Community, Purpose By Pedro Alexis Tabensky, Published by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2003, ISBN 0754607348, 9780754607342, page 205
- «"Introduction - Perspectives on Love and Agapé: Contemporary Views on Love" by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p.9
- «Hughes, pp 173–174.
- «See Hughes, pp 175–176. For an alternative view, see Kraut, chapter 2.
- «Strong B, Yarber WL, Sayad BW, Devault C (2008). Human sexuality: diversity in contemporary America (6th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. p. 228. ISBN 978-0-07-312911-2.
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